

Way-Nominalism:

An Ontological Ground for Non-Nominal Quantification

Abstract. In this paper, I propose a novel Nominalism about universals, I call *Way-Nominalism*. In Way-Nominalism, it is argued that ways that things are—e.g., being a human—exist and that ways things are take over the theoretical roles that universals play in Realism. Importantly, in Way-Nominalism, a way things are is understood in terms of how reality is carved up. Then, after showing that the ground that Rayo & Yablo (2001) put forward for their claim that the second-order non-nominal quantification carries no ontological commitment to entities of any sort is quite a *linguistic* and thereby a *shaky* ground, I offer Way-Nominalism as an *ontological* ground for their claim, which will serve as a *firm* and proper foundation for their claim.

Keywords. Nominalism, Ways, Joint-carving, Non-nominal Quantification, Second-order Quantification, Higher-order Metaphysics

Reference

- Armstrong, D. 1978. *Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I*. Cambridge University Press.
- Armstrong, D. 1997. *A World of States of Affairs*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bacon, A. 2020. “Logical Combinatorialism”. *Philosophical Review* 129 (4):537-589.
- Bennett, K. 2011. “By Our Bootstraps”. *Philosophical Perspectives* 25 (1):27-41.
- Bennett, K. 2017. *Making Things Up*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Berman, S. 2008. “Universals: Ways or Things?”, *Metaphysica* 9 (2):219-234.
- Bürge, T. 2007. “Predication and Truth”. *Journal of Philosophy*, 104(11): 580-60
- Correia, F. 2006. “Generic essence, objectual essence, and modality”. *Noûs*, 40(4): 753–767.
- Correia, F. 2017. “Real Definitions”. *Philosophical Issues*, 27(1): 52-73.
- Correia, F & Skiles, A. 2019. “Grounding, Essence, and Identity”. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 98(3): 642-670.
- Dorr, C. 2016. “To Be F Is To Be G”. *Philosophical Perspectives* 30 (1):39-134.
- Dudman, V. H. 1972. “‘Bedeutung’ in Frege: A Reply”. *Analysis* 33 (1):21-27.
- Etchemendy, J. 1999. *The Concept of Logical Consequence*. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
- Fine, K. 2015, “Unified Foundation for Essence and Ground”. *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*. 1(2): 296-311.
- Goldstein, L. 1983. “Scientific Scotism – the Emperor’s new trousers or has Armstrong made some real strides?”. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 61(1): 40-57.
- Goodman, J. forthcoming. “Higher-order logic as metaphysics”. In Peter Fritz & Jones Nicholas (eds.), *Higher-Order Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press.
- Hale, B., & Wright, C. 2012. “Horse Sense”. *Journal of Philosophy*, 109(1/2): 83-131
- Hofweber, T. 2021. “Why Our Natural Languages Are Ideal Languages for Metaphysics” In James Miller (ed.), *The Language of Ontology*. Oxford University Press: 88-101.

- Jones, N. (2018). Nominalist Realism. *Noûs* 52 (4):808-835.
- Künne, W. 2003. *Conceptions of Truth*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Liebesman, D. 2015. "Predication as Ascription". *Mind*, 124: 517-69.
- Lewis, D. 1983. "New work for a theory of universals". *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61 (4):343-377.
- Lewis, D. 1986. *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Lewis, D. 1997. "Finkish dispositions". *Philosophical Quarterly* 47 (187):143-158.
- Levinson, J. 1978. "Properties and Related Entities", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39(1): 1-22.
- MacBride, F. 2006. "Predicate reference". In Barry C. Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*. Oxford University Press: 422--475.
- McDaniel, K. 2009. "Ways of Being", In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds), *Metametaphysics*, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- McDaniel, K. 2017. *The Fragmentation of Being*, Oxford University Press.
- Oliver, A. 2005. "The Reference Principle". *Analysis* 65 (3):177–187.
- Orilia, F., & Paolini Paoletti, M. 2022. "Properties", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/>>.
- Prior, A. 1971. *Objects of Thought*. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
- Quine, W. 1948. "On What There Is". *Review of Metaphysics* 2 (5):21-38.
- Rayo, A. 2013. *The Construction of Logical Space*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Rayo, A & Yablo, S. 2001. "Nominalism through de-nominalization". *Noûs* 35 (1):74–92.
- Rieppel, M. 2016. "Being Something: Properties and Predicative Quantification". *Mind* 125 (499):643-689.
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. *Resemblance nominalism: a solution to the problem of universals*. New York:

Clarendon Press.

- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2019. "Nominalism in Metaphysics". *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/).
- Rosefeldt, T. 2008. "'That'-clauses and Non-nominal Quantification". *Philosophical Studies*, 137: 301
- Seargent, D. 1985. "Plurality and Continuity: An Essay in G.F. Stout's Theory of Universals". Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Schaffer, J. 2012. "Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity". In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 122-138.
- Schaffer, J. 2016. "Grounding in the image of causation". *Philosophical Studies* 173 (1):49-100.
- Schaffer, J. 2017. "Laws for Metaphysical Explanation". *Philosophical Issues* 27 (1):302-321.
- Searle, J. R. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shoemaker, S. 1980. "Causality and properties". In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), *Time and Cause*. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
- Sider, T. 1995. "Sparseness, immanence, and naturalness". *Noûs* 29 (3):360-377.
- Sider, T. 2010. *Logic for philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sider, T. 2011. *Writing the Book of the World*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Simons, P. 1994. "Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substance". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 (3):553-575.
- Skiba, L. 2021a. Higher-order metaphysics. *Philosophy Compass* 16 (10):1-11.
- Skiba, L. 2021b. Higher-order metaphysics and the tropes versus universals dispute. *Philosophical Studies* 178 (9):2805-2827.

- Strawson, P. F. 1987. "Concepts and properties or predication and copulation". *Philosophical Quarterly* 37 (149):402-406.
- Trueman, R. 2015. "The Concept Horse With No Name". *Philosophical Studies* 172 (7):1889-1906.
- Trueman, R. 2020. *Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Cleve, J. 1994. "Predication without universal? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 54(3): 577-590.
- Williamson, T. 2003. "Everything". *Philosophical Perspectives* 17 (1):415–465.
- Williamson, T. 2013. *Modal Logic as Metaphysics*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, A. 2018. "Metaphysical Causation". *Noûs* 52 (4):723-751.
- Wright, C. 1998. "Why Frege Does Not Deserve His *Granum Salis*. A Note on the Paradox of The Concept Horse and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates" In Brandl and Sullivan (ed), *New essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, Rodopi: 239-63.
- Wright, C. 2007. "On quantifying into predicate position: Steps towards a new (tralist) perspective". In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael Potter (eds.), *Mathematical Knowledge*. Oxford University Press: 150-74.
- Yablo, S. 1996. "How in the world?", In Christopher Hill (ed.), *Philosophical Topics*. University of Arkansas Press: 255-86.